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YET ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX DISASTER:
HOW A RECOVERY OF DAMAGES TURNS INTO A LIABILITY
ILIR MUJALOVIC*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are sixty years old and enter into an employ-
ment contract with your employer. The contract requires you to
perform the duties of the Executive Vice President of the company
until you reach the age of seventy. Four years later, when you are
sixty-four years old, your employer suddenly terminates your em-
ployment. You now have no job, no income, and most importantly,
none of the retirement benefits that were promised to you. Your
economic security has been shattered.
Angered by your early termination, you decide to sue your em-
ployer for wrongful discharge. When confronted, your employer
believes that you have a plausible case and offers an immediate pay-
ment of $250,000 for breach of the employment contract. In addi-
tion, the settlement agreement with your employer entitles you to
receive payments totaling $70,000 per year continuing for the dura-
tion of your life. News of the settlement gives you great relief. You
feel that your rights have been vindicated and your economic secur-
ity has been restored.
Shortly after the settlement, you receive a $245,000 invoice
from your attorney for the legal work performed. The contingent
fee agreement entitled the attorney to the full and immediate pay-
ment of the legal fees without regard to your award collection
schedule. As a result, after subtracting the $245,000 fee from the
$250,000 breach of contract award, your current year cash award
shrinks to only $5,000.
* JD New York Law School, summa cum laude, May 2003. This Note has been
awarded the Otto L. Walter Distinguished Writing Award, New York Law School, 2003.
I am extremely grateful to Professor Ann F. Thomas for her comments and advice. I
would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Tanina Rostain for her comments.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to my family, without whose support, gui-
dance, and love, this Note would not have been possible.
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The time comes to file your income tax return for the year. In
arriving at your adjusted gross income', you include the $250,000
award in your gross income, and you claim an "above the line"
2
deduction for the $245,000 legal fees paid. Although you believe
this income tax treatment of the award and the legal fees paid is in
accordance with the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), the Commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("Commissioner") disagrees.
Upon audit, the Commissioner states that the amount paid for the
legal fees can only be deducted as a miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tion3 (a "below the line" deduction). As such, although the fee ex-
pense deduction reduces your "regular" taxable income almost
dollar for dollar, it is completely disallowed in determining your
alternative minimum tax ("AMT") liability.
4
The AMT, you learn, is an alternative method for calculating
income tax liability for certain taxpayers whose adjusted gross in-
come exceeds a specific threshold amount, currently $175,000. 5 In-
cluding the $250,000 award in your gross income increases your
adjusted gross income beyond the threshold amount and, there-
fore, you are subject to the AMT. Although you have no regular tax
liability, your AMT liability is $57,000. You will probably have to
borrow this money to pay your taxes. Because of the AMT, the
$250,000 cash award leaves you with a net current year liability of
$52,000. While this result may seem odd and unfair, it is not a hy-
1. Adjusted gross income is defined in Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code
as gross income minus specific deductions listed in that Section. Usually, only business
expenses are deductible to arrive at adjusted gross income. Deductions for personal
and dependency exemptions, as well as standard or itemized deductions are subtracted
from adjusted gross income to arrive at taxable income. Expenses that are deductible
to arrive at adjusted gross income are known as "above the line" deductions; deductions
that are subtracted from adjusted gross income to arrive at taxable income are known as
"below the line" deductions. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 21-25 (4th ed. 2001).
2. See supra note 1 for definition of "above the line" and "below the line"
deductions.
3. See I.R.C. § 67(b) (2000); see also text accompanying notes 53-57 for a fuller
discussion of the miscellaneous itemized deductions.
4. See I.R.C. § 56(b) (1) (A) (i) (2000). Miscellaneous itemized deductions are dis-
allowed in computing taxpayer's AMT liability; see also text accompanying notes 71-72
(discussing reasons Congress enacted the AMT).
5. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(1, II) (2000). In the case of a married individual
filing a separate return the current threshold amount is $87,500. See I.R.C.
§ 55(b) (1) (A) (iii).
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pothetical problem. The situation outlined here is based on the
facts of Alexander v. Commissioner.
6
The extreme result in Alexander, brought on also by the timing
issue-the bulk of the award is to be received in the future but the
legal fees are paid in the first year-nonetheless illustrates a com-
mon problem that plaintiffs face regarding the income tax treat-
ment of the attorney fee expenses in contingent fee lawsuits.
Because the majority of the courts have held that cases like Alexan-
der were correctly decided, plaintiffs who recovered damages have
tried to avoid the harsh results of the AMT by claiming that portion
of the recovery that is paid to or retained by their attorney is ex-
cludable from gross income. When accepted, this argument elimi-
nates the problem of treating attorney fee expenses as
miscellaneous itemized deductions that leads to their non-deduct-
ibility for AMT purposes. Some courts, although a minority, have
supported this result.
This Note argues that although the application of the AMT, as
in Alexander, leads to highly inequitable results, the current state of
the law requires that the entire amount of taxable damages - in-
cluding the portion paid to or retained by the attorney as a contin-
gent fee - must be included in plaintiffs gross income. To claim
otherwise violates the basic principle of taxation that income
should be taxed to the one who earned it. However, in view of the
unfairness the AMT application creates and because the AMT
"problem" extends beyond contingent fee cases (i.e., plaintiffs that
hire hourly fee attorneys face the same result) a prompt legislative
action is required to resolve the issue.
Part II of this Note reviews the concept of gross income as it
developed from the inception of the modern IRC. This part fur-
ther considers the doctrine of assignment of income to determine
whether the amount claimed as attorney fees in contingent fee law-
suits should be included in a plaintiff's gross income. The purpose
of this doctrine is to prevent deflection of income from taxpayers in
higher tax brackets to taxpayers in lower tax brackets. This section
also discusses various deductions from gross income to explain the
6. 72 F.3d 938 (lst Cir. 1995). In Alexander, the plaintiff also received $100,000
for the age discrimination claim. However, at that time the payment was excludable
from gross income.
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proper income tax treatment of contingent legal fees paid by win-
ning plaintiffs. It is important to classify the deductions because all
categories of deductions are not treated the same under the IRC.
Certain deductions, as noted above, are disallowed in calculating
the AMT, which leads to results like those seen in Alexander.
Part III focuses on the specific issue of this Note whether the
amount of the recovery paid as attorney's contingent fees, when
damages are taxable, should be included or excluded from a plain-
tiff's gross income. This part also reviews the positions the circuit
courts and the tax court have taken regarding the issue.
Part IV examines the strengths and weaknesses of the various
approaches taken by the circuit courts and provides a proposed leg-
islative solution for resolving the existing split among the circuit
courts.
Finally, Part V summarizes the previous discussion and reem-
phasizes the inequitable results reached by the AMT application.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GROSS INCOME
A. The Concept of Gross Income
Section 61 of the IRC defines gross income as "all income from
whatever source derived."7 Courts have generally construed this
section very broadly in accordance with Congress' intent to tax in-
come comprehensively.8 As early as 1920, in Eisner v. Macomber, the
United States Supreme Court wrestled with the definition of in-
come. 9 In Macomber, the Court stated: "Income may be defined as
the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,
provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale
or conversion of capital assets."10
This definition was clarified and expanded in 1955 in the case
of Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, where the Court held that treble
damages in an antitrust case should be included in gross income of
7. See I.R.C. § 61 (a) (2000). This section also provides a nonexclusive list of items
that are specifically included in income. Attorney's fees in a contingent fee lawsuit are
not on this list.
8. See Thad Austin Davis, IN MEMORIAM: FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: Cotnam v. Com-
missioner and the Income Tax treatment of Contingency-based Attorneys'Fees-The Alabama At-
torney's Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl Head-on, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1683, 1691 (2000).
9. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
10. Id. at 207.
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the plaintiff.1 The Court stated that "the definition in Macomber
was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income
questions."1 2 It further explained that "Congress applied no limita-
tions as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to
their nature."'13 The Court liberally construed this broad defini-
tion, recognizing the intent of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted. 14 More importantly, the Court devel-
oped a three-prong test for determining gross income. The Court
stated that taxpayers have gross income in cases where they have
"[1] undeniable accessions to wealth, [2] clearly realized, and [3]
over which taxpayers have complete dominion."1 5 The receipt of
the punitive portion of damages in Glenshaw Glass satisfied all three
prongs of this test, and in the absence of a specific exemption in
the IRC, the Court held that punitive damages should be included
in the recipient's gross income. 16 The Glenshaw Glass rule to deter-
mine whether certain payments should be included or excluded
from gross income, has survived the test of time and still provides a
guide that courts use to decide what constitutes gross income.
17
B. Principles of Assignment of Income
In examining tax liability courts cannot focus only on what
constitutes gross income. They must also determine who the tax-
payer should be and to whom the gross income belongs.'8 Accord-
ing to the doctrine of assignment of income, income should be
taxed to the one who earned it. This doctrine prevents deflection
of income from a taxpayer in a higher tax-bracket to a taxpayer in a
11. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
12. Id. at 431.
13. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429,430.
14. Id. at 429,430. The Court further rejected the respondents' narrow characteri-
zation of income in Macomber as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined."
15. Id. at 431.
16. Id. at 432.
17. See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995) (finding that tax-
payer's settlement award for back pay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 was includable in gross income); Commissioner v.
Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83 (1977) (finding that cash meal allowances given to the tax-
payer from his employer were includible in gross income and not subject to exclusion
under § 119 of the IRC).
18. See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 87.
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lower tax-bracket. It is best understood by comparing the tax treat-
ment of income received from different sources, such as income
received for services performed and income received from
property.
1. Income Received For Services Performed
In Lucas v. Earl, Justice Holmes developed a touchstone for the
assignment of income doctrine. 19 The issue in the case was
whether Earl, an attorney, should be taxed on the entire amount of
the fees collected for services he performed, or whether half of the
fees should be taxed to his wife because of theirjoint tenancy agree-
ment.20 Earl and his wife signed a contract to jointly own all prop-
erty they acquired during marriage, including all earnings in the
form of salaries and fees.21 The Court rejected Earl's argument
that the joint tenancy agreement made half of the fees earned by
him his wife's income for tax purposes.2 2 It stated that "tax could
not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even
for a second in the man who earned it."23 Consequently, even
though the contract was valid as a matter of state property and con-
tract law, for income tax purposes, it was ineffective in transferring
the income from Earl, who earned it, to his wife.
24
In Armantrout v. Commissioner, the Tax Court followed the rea-
soning of Lucas.25 The employer in Armantrout funded an "Educo"
trust for children of certain key employees to pay for their college
expenses.2 6 According to the court, payments made to the trust for
the benefit of the employees' children had a "substantial compensa-
tory flavor" with regard to the parents-employees. 27 For this reason,
the Tax Court applied the Lucas' doctrine of assignment of income
concluding that "the anticipatory arrangements designed to deflect
19. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
20. Id. at 113.
21. Id. at 113-114.
22. Id. at 113.
23. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114-115.
24. Id. at 114.
25. See Armantrout v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 996, affd., 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1978).
26. See Armantrout, 67 T.C. at 998.
27. Id. at 1007.
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income away from the proper taxpayer will not be given effect to
avoid tax liability."28 The real substance of the transaction was to
allow the transfer of a portion of the employees' earnings to their
children as a qualified tax-free scholarship. 29 But for the parents'
performing services, no trust for the children would have been es-
tablished and no scholarships would have been paid; therefore, the
income belonged to the parents.
2. Income Received From Property
As Lucas and Armantrout hold, income paid as compensation
for services is generally taxed to the one who performed the ser-
vices. 30 On the other hand, income derived from property is gener-
ally taxed to the one who owned the property at the time the
income was received. Once the owner of property parts with his
ownership interest in the income-producing property, the income
produced by the property is generally taxed to the transferee of the
property.
In Blair v. Commissioner,31 Blair, a beneficiary of a testamentary
trust, permanently assigned a portion of his income interest in the
trust to his children.3 2 As a result of the assignment, the trustee
distributed the income directly to the children.33 The Commis-
sioner ruled that the transaction was an invalid assignment of in-
come, and therefore the income should be taxed to the father. 34
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Com-
missioner and held that the income was taxable to the father upon
the ground that "his interest was not attached to the corpus of the
estate and that the income was not subject to disposition until he
received it.''35 Accordingly, the court concluded that the "income
was [the father's] and his assignment [to the children] was merely a
direction to pay over to others what was due to himself.
'3 6
28. Armantrout, 67 T.C. at 1005.
29. See Armantrout, 67 T.C. at 1005.
30. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114; see also Armantrout, 67 T.C. at 1003.
31. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8; see also Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1936).
36. See Blair, 300 U.S. at 12.
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Cir-
cuit3 7 and held that "the conveyancer was not seeking to limit the
assignment so as to make it anything less than a complete transfer
of the specified interest."38 The trust agreement entitled the trans-
feree, the father, during his life, to the net income of the property
held in trust.39 The father thus became the owner of "an equitable
interest in the corpus of the property, '40 and was entitled to en-
force the trust.41 The interest was "present property alienable like
any other, in the absence of a valid restraint upon alienation. '42
The Court held that the assignments were valid, and the father
could thus transfer a part of the interest as well as the whole. 43
Consequently, a gift of the property interest shifted the income
from the property from the father to the children.
Helvering v. Horst involved a similar issue.44 In Horst, the re-
spondent, a father, owned a number of negotiable bonds from
which he removed the interest coupons and delivered them to his
son as a gift, who collected the interest at maturity.45 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held for the father and stated that
"[w]hen the [father] detached the coupons and handed them over
to his son as a gift, the son acquired full [... ] dominion. The [fa-
ther] could not interfere in any way with the donee's control and
right to receive the money when the coupons matured."46 As a re-
sult, the income belonged to the son.
47
The Supreme Court reversed Horst, relying on the reasoning
set forth in Blair.48 The Court distinguished the facts of this case
from Blair, by focusing on the fact that in Blair the father gave a
portion of his entire income-producing property to his children,
whereas in Horst, the donor, the father, retained control of the in-
37. Blair, 300 U.S. at 14.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Blair, 300 U.S. at 13.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
45. Id. at 114.
46. See Helvering v. Horst, 107 F.2d 906, 907 (2d Cir. 1939).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 119.
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come-producing bond, and he merely parted with the right to re-
ceive some of the interest payment. 49 The Court noted that "where
the donor retains control of the property the income is taxable to
him although he paid it to the donee."50 The Court explained that
the "dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of in-
come to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it
and enjoy the benefit when paid."1 Therefore, the Court held that
the income was taxable to the respondent, the father, because he
merely parted with the interest coupons and never relinquished
control over the source of income to his son.
5 2
C. Section 162 and Section 212 Deductions and the
Origin of the Claim Doctrine
In addition to determining what constitutes gross income and
to whom the income belongs, federal tax law defines the deduc-
tions that are allowed in determining taxable income. Although
the Supreme Court and Congress have defined gross income
broadly to include "all income from whatever source derived,"53 the
same has not been true for deductions. Only those expenses speci-
fied in the IRC are deductible in determining taxable income.
There are generally two instances where plaintiffs may deduct
the amount of their attorney's contingent fees from their gross in-
come. 54 First, Section 162 (a) of the IRC provides that "[t]here
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business. ' 55 For a self-employed individual or a sole pro-
prietor, carrying on a trade or business, expenses falling within Sec-
tion 162 (a) are deductible from gross income to arrive at
individual taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 56 Attorney's fees paid
49. Horst, 311 U.S. at 119.
50. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 119.
51. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 119.
52. Congress has changed the outcome in Horst, but Horst is still cited for its doc-
trine; see also I.R.C. § 1286 (2000).
53. See text accompanying notes 7-17 for a fuller discussion of gross income.
54. It is worth noting that attorney's fees are deductible only if the damages are
taxable. If a client is awarded damages that are excludible from gross income then no
portion of the attorney's fees are deductible.
55. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000).
56. See id. at § 62(a)(1) (2000).
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by such a taxpayer to further his or her trade or business may be
deductible under Section 162. However, Section 62 (a) (1) makes it
clear that if the "trade or business" of the taxpayer consists of the
performance of services by the taxpayer as an "employee," then Sec-
tion 162 deductions are not allowed to reduce taxpayer's gross in-
come to arrive at his or her adjusted gross income.57 Instead, they
are treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions and are subject to
many statutory restrictions. But most significantly, Section 162 de-
ductions for miscellaneous expenses are disallowed completely in
determining the AMT liability.58 Thus, when the Tax Court in Alex-
ander held that attorney contingent fees paid by the plaintiff to re-
cover damages for breach of the employment contract were an
"unreimbursed employee business expense, '59 Alexander was com-
pelled to treat those expenses as miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions, 60 and was exposed to the AMT on the entire amount of this
expense. As a result, the entire deduction for the legal fees paid
was disallowed.
The second opportunity for plaintiffs-taxpayers to deduct attor-
ney's contingent fees arises from Section 212 of the IRC. 61 Accord-
ing to this Section, an individual shall be allowed to deduct "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxa-
ble year for the production or collection of income. '62 This Sec-
tion permits taxpayers to deduct "ordinary and necessary" expenses
incurred in income-producing activities that do not qualify as a
57. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (1) (2000). Moreover, it is well established that an individual
may be engaged in the trade or business of rendering services as an employee.
58. See id. at §§ 67(b), 56 (b)(1)(A)(i).
59. The IRC distinguishes between "reimbursed" and "unreimbursed" employee
expenses. Unreimbursed employee expenses are incurred by an employee in the
course of his employment for which the employer provides no reimbursment. They are
deductible from gross income as miscellaneous itemized deductions and completely
disallowed for AMT purposes. Reimbursed expenses consist of expenses paid or in-
curred by the taxpayer-employee in the course of the employment, "under a
reimbursment or other expense allowance arrangement with his employer." Reim-
bursed employee expenses are fully deductible under both the regular income tax and
the AMT. See id. at § 62(a)(1)-(2).
60. Section 67(b) of the IRC defines miscellaneous itemized deductions as deduc-
tions that are not specifically listed in Section 67(b). Because unreimbursed employee
expenses are not included in Section 67(b) they are treated as miscellaneous itemized
deductions.
61. See id. at § 212(1).
62. Id.
[Vol. 47
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX DISASTER
trade or business. 63 When a taxpayer incurs expenses in generating
gross income in an activity that does not qualify as a trade or busi-
ness, usually an investment activity, the expenses are generally de-
ductible as miscellaneous itemized deductions.64 For example,
legal fees incurred to collect accrued rents on a property held for
investment purposes are deductible under Section 212. However,
Section 212 expenses-similar to Section 162 expenses-are not
deductible in determining taxpayer's AMT liability because they are
classified as miscellaneous itemized deductions. 65
Even if a court finds that the legal fees were incurred in "carry-
ing on any trade or business," or "in the production or collection of
income," as Sections 162 or 212 require, the deductions for legal
fees may still be disallowed based on the "origin of the claim" doc-
trine. This doctrine is used to distinguish nondeductible personal
expenses from deductible profit-seeking expenses. In United States
v. Gilmore,6 6 the United States Supreme Court explained the origin
of the claim doctrine stating that deductibility of expenses from
gross income "turns wholly upon the nature of the activities to
63. See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 216.
64. Section 212 deductions are not on the list provided in section 67(b) and,
therefore, they are treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions, subject to all the stat-
utory limitations. There is an exception, however, for deductions with regard to rents
and royalties; they are not treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions and are de-
ductible from gross income under Section 62(a)(4). See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 216;
see also I.R.C. § 62(a)(4) (2000).
65. In addition to the above limitations, there is an important caveat that applies
to Section 212 deductions. They are subject to three special rules. First, as previously
noted, legal fees paid when deductible under Section 212 are treated as miscellaneous
itemized deductions. The IRC allows miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the
extent that they exceed two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. Conse-
quently, it is almost always certain that a taxpayer will not be able to deduct one hun-
dred percent of the legal fees paid, unless his or her adjusted gross income is zero or
negative. In addition, if the legal fees paid are less than two percent of a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income then the deduction is completely disallowed. Second, according
to Section 68(a) of the IRC, miscellaneous itemized deductions are subject to a limita-
tion when a taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a specific threshold amount,
which is adjusted every year for inflation. Finally, as stated previously, Section 56 of the
IRC requires that attorney's fees, when deducted as miscellaneous itemized deductions
subject to the two percent limitation for "regular" tax purposes, must be added back to
gross income when computing the taxpayer's AMT liability. Therefore, deductions for
attorney fees paid are allowed for "regular" tax purposes, but are disallowed when calcu-
lating taxpayer's AMT liability.
66. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
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which they relate. ' 67 If a taxpayer recovers an award that is per-
sonal in nature, such as an award relating to defamation of charac-
ter or emotional distress, then the legal fees incurred in the process
of recovery are not deductible. If a plaintiff, however, incurred le-
gal fees in the recovery of an award relating to a profit-seeking activ-
ity, such as in collection of back pay or lost wages, then the legal
fees would be deductible from gross income. In Gilmore, the tax-
payer deducted the amount of legal fees incurred to defend against
his wife's claim in a divorce proceeding where she claimed that cer-
tain assets belonged to her under the California community prop-
erty law.68 The Court reversed the lower court and held that the
legal fees paid were not deductible business expenses because
"[the] aspects of the wife's claims stemmed entirely from the mari-
tal relationship, and not, under any tenable view of things, from
income-producing activity."'69 The Court emphasized that "the
characterization, as 'business' or 'personal,' of the litigation costs of
resisting a claim depends on whether or not the claim arises in con-
nection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities.
'70
D. Principles of Alternative Minimum Tax
According to a 1987 report from the Staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation:
[T]he [alternative] minimum tax should serve one over-
riding objective: to ensure that no taxpayer with substan-
tial economic income can avoid significant tax liability by
using exclusions, deductions, and credits .... The ability
of high-income taxpayers to pay little or no tax under-
mines respect for the entire system and, thus, for the in-
centive provisions themselves.
71
By enacting the AMT, Congress attempted to broaden the general
tax base because the AMT is applicable to all taxpayers regardless of
their ability to eliminate regular tax liability.72 This alternative mea-
67. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 46.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Id. at 51.
70. See id. at 48 (emphasis in original).
71. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, at 429 (Comm. Print 1987).
72. See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 853.
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sure of income is designed to capture the real economics of tax-
payer's income, especially in circumstances where taxpayers
through various statutory deductions and exclusions are able to re-
duce their regular tax liability below their equitable share. When
taxpayer's AMT liability is greater than the regular tax liability the
taxpayer must pay the greater amount.
Although the AMT's overriding purpose to achieve fairness is
laudable, it leads to inequitable and no doubt unintended results in
cases such as Alexander. When a plaintiff receives a taxable award in
an employment related case that brings his or her adjusted gross
income above the AMT threshold, contingent legal fees that he or
she paid reduce the real economic income. However, because of
the AMT, the deduction for the legal fees paid is completely disal-
lowed. For such plaintiffs, the combination of nondeductible legal
fees paid plus taxes on the entire damages award, including the
attorney's portion of the recovery, can reduce most of the award, or
as in Alexander the taxpayer could end up with an after-tax loss. As a
result, the plaintiff's economic position is overstated because the
entire recovery of damages is included in gross income and the de-
duction for legal fees paid is disallowed for AMT purposes. The
inequitable results of the AMT effectively turn the income tax into a
gross receipts tax for the plaintiff.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT AND THE SPECIFIC CASES
Taxpayers-plaintiffs have attempted to avoid the inequitable re-
sults of the AMT in situations like Alexander, by arguing that the
amount of their attorney's contingent fees should be excluded
from their gross income because it belongs to their attorney. They
strive to escape the application of AMT by treating the amount of
legal fees paid as an exclusion from gross income, rather than a
miscellaneous itemized deduction. 73
The federal circuit courts are split as to whether plaintiffs in
contingent fee lawsuits must include the attorney's share of taxable
73. Stated differently, plaintiffs attempt to characterize the deduction for legal
fees paid as "above the line," rather than "below the line." "Above the line" deductions
are not treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions, which are not deductible in de-
termining the AMT liability. See also Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating that plaintiffs attempt to treat the amount paid for legal fees in con-
tingent lawsuits as a "reduction" and not a "deduction" from gross income).
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damages in their gross income.7 4 The majority of the circuits in-
clude the attorney's portion of the award in the plaintiffs gross in-
come. 75 The most frequent rationale provided for this holding is
that the attorney's contingent fee is a deduction from, and not a
reduction of, gross income. 76 Therefore, the plaintiff must include
the total award in his gross income and may be able to take a mis-
cellaneous itemized deduction for the amount of the legal fees
paid.
A vocal minority takes the opposite view and excludes the attor-
ney's contingent fees from the plaintiffs gross income on the
ground that that portion of the award belongs to the attorney from
the outset of the litigation. 77 Under this view, the attorney becomes
a part owner of the claim, with an equitable lien in the amount of
damages received by the client-plaintiff. 78 As a part owner, the in-
come represented by the contingent fee belongs to the attorney
and not the client.
A. The Majority of Circuits Include the Amount of Contingent Fees in
the Client's Gross Income
1. The Seventh Circuit Approach
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt
with the tax treatment of attorney contingent fees in the case of
Kenseth v. Commissioner.79 Kenseth brought an age discrimination
suit against his former employer.80 After negotiations, the parties
settled the case for approximately $230,000 of which Kenseth actu-
ally received only 60% or $106,000. The other 40%, or $92,000, was
remitted directly to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent fee con-
tract.8 ' Of the entire settlement amount, approximately $32,500
was paid to Kenseth for lost wages and back pay.8 2
74. See Kenseth, at 883.
75. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883; compare Cotnam supra note 142; Srivastava supra note
158; Clarks supra note 173; Davis supra note 193;
76. Id.
77. See Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
78. Id.
79. 259 F.3d 881.
80. Id. at 882.
81. Id.
82. Kenseth v. C.I.R., 114 T.C. 399, 404 (2000).
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In reporting his income for the year, Kenseth only included
the amount of the back pay, excluding the amount of the attorney's
contingent fees paid.83 Kenseth did not claim a deduction for the
attorney's fees paid.8 4 The Commissioner issued a deficiency, and
increased his gross income by the amount of the attorney's fees that
he had omitted.8 5 Thrown into the AMT by the resulting increase
in his adjusted gross income, Kenseth's tax liability increased by ap-
proximately $17,000.86 Kenseth challenged the deficiency, and the
case proceeded in the United States Tax Court.
87
The Tax Court ruled for the Commissioner, and held that Ken-
seth must include the entire amount of taxable damages in his
gross income.88 The court also stated that the amount Kenseth
paid to the attorney is deductible from gross income under Section
162 for purposes of regular tax liability although not for AMT pur-
poses. 89 Dissatisfied with the outcome, Kenseth appealed to the
Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner, writing for the majority of the court,
agreed with the reasoning of the Tax Court and affirmed its deci-
sion. 90 Judge Posner's analysis began by stating that the circuits are
split over whether the amount paid as a contingent fee to attorneys
when damages are taxable is part of a client's-plaintiff s gross in-
come.9' In discussing the issue, he found it puzzling that some cir-
cuits, such as the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh, treat attorney fees in
hourly fee contracts and contingent fee contracts differently.92 He
rejected Kenseth's argument that contingent fee attorneys receive a
proprietary interest in the client's cause of action. He stated that
although the Wisconsin law gives contingent fee attorneys a lien or
a security interest in the client's claim, the ownership of a security
interest or a lien on the claim is not ownership of such security.
93




87. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 399.
88. Id. at 417.
89. Id.
90. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883. Judge Posner's reputation and expertise in law
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Furthermore, he explained it would be a violation of lawyer's ethi-
cal standards to acquire "a proprietary interest in the cause of ac-
tion or subject matter litigation the lawyer is conducting for the
client. '94 Therefore, according to Wisconsin law, an attorney can
only obtain a lien or enter into a contingent fee contract, and
neither option gives lawyers a proprietary interest in a client's cause
of action.
9 5
The court also rejected Kenseth's argument that he relin-
quished control over his income-producing asset - i.e., the age dis-
crimination claim.96 The court again compared the contingent fee
contract with an hourly fee contract and stated that Kenseth no
more relinquished control of his claim to his contingent fee lawyer
than he would have relinquished control to an hourly fee lawyer.97
Kenseth had control over his claim because Kenseth could fire the
contingent fee lawyer at any time just as he could fire an hourly fee
lawyer.98
Kenseth also raised the argument that the AMT creates grave
inequities because it denied him the opportunity to deduct the
amount of the expenses "reasonably incurred for the production of
income."99 In response, the court strongly stated that "it is not a
feasible judicial undertaking to achieve global equity in taxa-
tion,"100 especially in this case where means of eliminating one in-
equity would create another one, that is, create an "artificial a[nd]
purely tax-motivated, incentive to substitute contingent [fee attor-
neys] for hourly fee [attorneys] .-101 The court affirmed the ruling
of the Tax Court and held that the entire amount of the attorney's
contingent fee must be included in Kenseth's gross income. 10
2
94. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883.
95. Id. at 883, 884.




100. Id. at 885.
101. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884. The inequity would be greater because plaintiffs
that hire hourly fee attorneys would still face the harsh results of the AMT, and similarly
situated plaintiffs-taxpayers would not be treated equally.
102. Id. at 883.
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2. The Federal Circuit Approach
In the 1995 case of Baylin v. United States, Baylin, a tax matter
partner for a partnership, filed suit on behalf of the partnership
against the state of Maryland for land condemnation. 10 3 After the
jury increased the original condemnation award by only $1.2 mil-
lion, the partnership entered into a contingent fee agreement with
its attorney to appeal the jury's verdict.10 4 Following further negoti-
ations, the parties settled for approximately $16.3 million. 10 5 Attor-
ney's fees amounted to approximately $4 million. 10 6 One of the
issues on appeal was whether the partnership should include in its
gross income the amount of the attorney's contingent fees paid.10 7
The court relied on substance over form and stated that the
partnership clearly received the benefit of the funds because the
funds served to discharge the obligation of the partnership to pay
the attorney. 08 The court also noted: "[the fact] that the partner-
ship assigned a portion of its condemnation recovery to its attorney
before it knew the exact amount of the recovery does not mean that
this amount never belonged to the partnership."' 0 9 The fact that
the fee was not fixed, and the state paid a portion of the settlement
amount directly to the attorney "cannot dictate the income tax
treatment of those fees.""10 Therefore, the court concluded that
attorney's fees should be included in the partnership's gross
income.
3. The First and the Fourth Circuit Approaches
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered the issue in Young v. Commissioner.' 11 The taxpayer's liability to
her attorneys, in the amount of approximately $300,000, was dis-
charged when her spouse transferred land to the taxpayer in pursu-




107. Id. at 1454.
108. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
109. Id. at 1455.
110. Id.
111. 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
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ance of a settlement agreement. 1 2 The taxpayer sold the land and
used a part of the amount realized to pay her attorneys who helped
her collect the settlement amount. The Tax Court found that the
amount of sales proceeds used to discharge her obligation for legal
fees paid to her attorneys should have been included in her gross
income.
113
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court.114 The court
cited Lucas, and stated: "to allow Mrs. Young to escape income taxa-
tion from discharge of her legal obligation would be equivalent to
permitting her to avoid taxation by 'skillfully devising' the method
of paying her attorneys' fees." 1" 5 The court rejected the reasoning
of Cotnam v. Commissioner,1 16 and noted that a contingent fee agree-
ment does not give attorneys an interest in a client's cause of ac-
tion.117 The common law of North Carolina gives attorneys a
charging lien in the judgment but the lien does not attach to the
client's cause of action. 118 As a result, "an attorney's right to [the]
contingent fee matures at the same time the judgment is rendered
or settlement achieved-i.e., when the client's income is earned.""19
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the issue
in Alexander.120 The court held that the entire settlement award
from a wrongful termination claim should be included in the cli-
ent's gross income because the payments received were a substitute
for lost wages and the benefits the taxpayer would have received
under the employment contract.12' The taxpayer in this case in-
cluded the entire damages award in his gross income; thus, the
court did not reach the issue of whether, in a contingent fee law-
suit, the amount attributable to attorney's fees should be excluded
from gross income. 122 However, the court did find that legal fees in
112. Young, 240 F.3d at 372.
113. Young, 240 F.3d at 376.
114. Id. at 379.
115. Id. at 376.
116. 263 F.2d 119. See supra notes 142-172 for a full discussion of the Cotnam
decision.
117. Young, 240 F.3d at 379.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 6.
121. See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 944.
122. Id. at 940.
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this case should be treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions
and, as such, subject to the rules of the AMT.
1 23
4. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In 2000, the issue in Coady v. Commissioner124 was whether the
petitioner was entitled to exclude $168,000 from her gross income
for contingent legal fees incurred in securing a judgment for lost
wages against her employer. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit answered the question in the negative. 125 It first noted that
the Cotnam decision had been subject to great disagreement be-
tween the circuit courts. 126 After examining various circuit court
decisions, the court was persuaded by Baylin, Alexander, and Judge
Wisdom's dissent in Cotnam.12 7 Moreover, the court distinguished
Cotnam because under Alaska law, attorneys do not have a superior
lien or ownership interest in the cause of action as they do in Ala-
bama and Michigan.1 28 According to the Alaska statute, an attor-
ney's lien attaches to property belonging to the client and it does
not confer ownership interest.
129
The court also looked at the origin of the claim doctrine to
determine whether the amount of the attorney's fees should be in-
cluded in the taxpayer's gross income. 130 It concluded that since
the award was clearly in lieu of wages and compensation, there was
no statutory or other basis for excluding the award from the tax-
payer's gross income.
1 3 1
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue again in Benci-
Woodward v. Commissioner.1 3 2 The court awarded petitioners, em-
ployees of Target Stores, punitive damages against a division of Tar-
get Stores for defamation.1 33 The court, relying on Coady, rejected
the petitioners argument that the amount of the attorneys' contin-
123. Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946.
124. 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
125. Id. at 1187.
126. Id. at 1189.
127. Id. at 1190.
128. Id.
129. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 942.
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gent fees incurred in the prosecution of the claim should be ex-
cluded from their gross income.1 34 Since the case arose under
California law, the court examined the California attorney lien stat-
ute.1 35 The court held that the California lien statute did not oper-
ate to transfer ownership of a client's cause of action to the
attorney.13 6 It emphasized that the lien statute merely gave attor-
neys a lien upon a client's recovery. Thus, there was no basis for
claiming that clients did not own the entire award in a contingent
fee lawsuit. 1
37
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed Coady and Benci-Wood-
ward in Sinyard v. Commissioner, over a strong dissent by Judge Mc-
Keown. 138 Judge McKeown was particularly concerned with harsh
inequities that may result from the disallowance of the deduction
for legal fees in determining the AMT. 139 Judge McKeown strongly
stated that "the 'victorious' plaintiff would have been better off
[....] [if] she had never filed her ultimately victorious suit."' 40 How-
ever, the court declined to follow the Cotnam decision and held
that, "[t]he discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is
equivalent to receipt by the person taxed."' 41
B. Circuits that Exclude Attorney's Contingent Fees from
Client's Gross Income
1. The Fifth Circuit Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first ruled on this
issue in 1959 in Cotnam v. Commissioner.142 In Cotnam, Mrs. Cotnam
brought a claim for breach of contract against the administrator of
134. Woodward, 219 F.3d at 943.
135. Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 943.
136. Id.
137. Id. Benci-Woodward decision is particularly important because it is one of the
most recent cases regarding the tax treatment of contingent attorney fees to which the
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari. By allowing the decision to stand,
one could imply that the Court agrees with the result.
138. Sinyard v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001).
139. Id. at 762.
140. Id at 763. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
141. See id at 758. (citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716,726
(1929)).
142. 263 F.2d 119.
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the Estate of T. Shannon. 143 The Supreme Court of Alabama up-
held the validity of the contract under which, the testator, Shannon
Hunter, promised Mrs. Cotnam one-fifth of his estate in considera-
tion for Mrs. Cotnam's services to him as an "attendant or friend for
the rest of his life." 144 Mrs. Cotnam was awarded $120,000 for
breach of contract and her attorney's contingent fees amounted to
approximately $50,000.145
The issue in this case was whether or not the amount paid to
the attorney from the judgment in favor of Mrs. Cotnam should be
excluded from her gross income on the theory that the income be-
longed to her attorney. 14 6 The court answered the question affirm-
atively.147 The court relied on the Alabama attorney's lien statute,
which stated:
Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, [attorneys
at law] shall have a lien superior to all liens but tax liens,
and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy said suit, judg-
ment or decree, until the lien or claim of the attorney for
his fees is fully satisfied; and attorneys at law shall have the
same right and power over said suits, judgments and de-
crees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had or may
have for the amount due thereon to them.
1 4 8
The court stated that this case did not involve assignment of
income within the doctrine of assignment of income developed in
Lucas.149 Mrs. Cotnam's claim had no fair market value at the be-
ginning of the lawsuit, and it was doubtful as to whether it ever had
any value. 150 Therefore, the court stated "she assigned to her attor-
neys forty percent of the claim in order that she might collect the
remaining sixty percent."15 1 The court distinguished Horst by stat-
ing that the only economic benefit to the plaintiff-taxpayer was an
143. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 120.
144. Cotnam, 263 F.3d at 120.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 121.
147. Id.
148. Ala. Code § 64 (2000).
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aid to the collection of a part of an otherwise worthless claim. 152
Unlike Horst, the taxpayer had not "fully enjoyed the benefit of his
[her] economic gain represented by his [her] right to receive in-
come."1 53 Therefore, the court observed that realistically the attor-
neys' contingent fees were not income to Mrs. Cotnam.154 The
court also rejected the argument that payment to the attorneys was
a satisfaction of her legal obligation by a third party. 155 It noted
that Mrs. Cotnam never obligated herself to pay the attorneys.
1 56
The fee was contingent upon the success of the litigation.
157
Some forty-one years later, the court in Srivastava v. Commis-
sioner followed Cotnam.158 In this case, the petitioners, two medical
doctors, sued a Texas television station for airing false and defama-
tory reports about the quality of the work they performed. 159 The
jury awarded $29 million in damages to the doctors. 160 After the
defendants appealed, the parties reached a settlement of $8.5 mil-
lion.1 61 The Commissioner challenged the doctors' claim that the
amount paid as attorney's contingent fees should be excluded from
their gross income.162 The Commissioner issued a deficiency no-
tice to the doctors in the amount of approximately $1.4 million.1
63
The Fifth Circuit, relying on Cotnam, ruled for the doctors.
164
The court acknowledged that attorney's fees in contingent fee law-
suits should not be treated differently than attorney's fees in non-
contingent fee lawsuits.1 65 Moreover, the court emphasized that
the doctors "ought not receive preferential tax treatment from the
simple fortuity that he [they] hired counsel on a contingent [fee]
152. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
153. Id at 126.




158. Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
159. Id. at 355.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 356.
163. Id.
164. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357.
165. Id. It is worth noting that had the doctors chosen an hourly fee agreement in
lieu of a contingent fee agreement then clearly the entire amount of the award would
have been included in their gross income.
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basis. 1 6 6 It stated that the "form of attorney's compensation
should not affect the gain petitioners enjoy from a favorable resolu-
tion of the litigation."'
67
The court, however, refused to distinguish Cotnam from the
case before it.168 It rejected the Commissioner's distinction that
Texas law gives contingent fee attorneys a lesser degree of power to
enforce their rights than does Alabama. 169 The court stated that
whether the amount of the attorney's contingent fees should be in-
cluded in a client's gross income should not depend "on the intri-
cacies of an attorney's bundle of rights against the opposing party
under the law of the governing state." 1 70 The court saw the Com-
missioner's attempt to distinguish Cotnam as a pretext to directly
challenge the Cotnam reasoning, which the court was bound by.1
7 '
The court refused to overrule Cotnam.
17 2
2. The Sixth Circuit Approach
In 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted
the issue of the tax treatment of attorney's contingent fees in Estate
of Clarks v. United States.1 7 3 In Clarks, the decedent, prior to his
death, was awarded $5.6 million against K-Mart for personal injuries
suffered while unloading his truck.1 74 K-Mart paid the decedent
$5.6 million to satisfy the judgment and approximately $5.7 million
in interest. 1 75 Attorneys' contingent fees amounted to approxi-
mately $3.8 million of the total award of nearly $11.3 million, which
also included approximately $1.9 of the interest award.
176
The sole issue on appeal was whether the $1.9 million interest
portion paid to the attorneys should be included in the decedent's
gross income. 77 The amount of damages received on account of
166. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363.
167. Id.
168. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 357.
169. Id. at 363.
170. Id. at 364.
171. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365.
172. Id.
173. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
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personal physical injuries was not an issue because it was specifically
excluded from gross income by the IRC. 178 The court held that the
interest portion paid to the attorneys should not be included in the
client's gross income. 179 The court relied heavily on Cotnam and
treated the $3.8 million as income of the attorneys only, noting that
the attorneys' common law lien in this case was similar to the attor-
ney's lien in the Alabama Cotnam case. 180 The court was satisfied
that "[a] lthough the underlying claim for personal injury was origi-
nally owned by the client, the client lost his right to receive pay-
ment for the lawyer's portion of the judgment."181 The court
reinforced its holding by citing to the old Michigan Supreme Court
decision Dreiband v. Candler,182 which stated that, "the [contingent
fee] amounts to an assignment [to the attorney] of a portion of the
judgment sought to be recovered."'
183
The court distinguished Lucas and Horst on three grounds.
First, the court stated that the taxpayer's purpose of shifting tax
liability was not present in this case, unlike Lucas and Horst where
the court found that the transfer of income was motivated by lower-
ing the transferor's tax liability. 184 Second, in Lucas and Horst the
income was already earned prior to the assignment of income. 1
85
In contrast, in Clarks, "there was no res, no fund, no proceeds, no
vested interest, [prior to the assignment] only a hope to receive
money from the lawyer's efforts and the client's right, a right yet to
be determined by judge and jury."'186 Finally, in Lucas and Horst,
the transfers were treated as gifts and the donees were not taxed on
the value of the property transfer. 187 In Clarks, however, the attor-
ney did not escape taxation.188 He was taxed fully on his portion of
the award.189 The transaction in this case was more like a division
178. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2000).
179. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 857.
182. 166 Mich. 49,131 (1911).
183. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.





189. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
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of property than an assignment of income.1 90 The court treated
the attorney and the client as if they were tenants in common with
respect to the claim.1 91 It concluded that "[t]he income should be
charged to the one who earned it and received it, not .... to one




3. The Eleventh Circuit Approach
The issue in Davis v. Commissioner9 3 was whether the portion of
the judgment paid directly to the client's attorney in a contingent
fee lawsuit should be included in the client's gross income. After
winning a lawsuit against her mortgage company, the respondent,
Mrs. Davis, was awarded $6 million in punitive damages and ap-
proximately $151,000 in compensatory damages. 194 Initially, Mrs.
Davis did not report any amount of the award on her 1992 tax re-
turn.1 95 However, upon audit, the Commissioner determined that
the entire punitive award should have been included in her gross
income for that year.1 96 Upon petition by Mrs. Davis, the Tax Court
held that although punitive damages were correctly included in
Mrs. Davis' income, the amount paid to her attorneys, under the
contingent fee agreement, was not taxable under Cotnam.197 In its
very brief decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision and found that the panel was
bound by Cotnam,198 which could only be overruled by an en banc
court. 199
In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Davis in the case of
Foster v. United States.200 In Foster, the court held that post-judgment
interest was excludable from plaintiffs gross income because it be-
190. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
191. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 858.
192. Id.
193. 210 F.3d 1346 (llth Cir. 2000).




198. In 1981, the Eleventh Circuit was split off from the Fifth Circuit and decisions
from Fifth Circuit are binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit.
199. See Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347.
200. 249 F.3d 1275 (lth Cir. 2001).
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longed to her attorneys as payment for costs of appeal. 20 1 The
court found that Alabama law, which stated that attorneys "have a
lien superior to all liens but tax lien," governed Foster's case and
the fee arrangements. 20 2 Therefore, as in Cotnam, the post-judg-
ment interest belonged to the attorney and not the client.
IV. THE UNFAIRNESS CREATED BY THE MAJORITY VIEW AND THE
MINORITY' S CRY FOR CHANGE
In view of the substantial disagreement between the circuit
courts, it is necessary for Congress to enact a legislative solution.
203
This part of the note analyzes and evaluates the reasoning and argu-
ments behind the majority and the minority view. Finding that a
balanced approach is needed, and that current approaches do not
adequately resolve the problem, this part proposes a legislative solu-
tion, which incorporates various concerns expressed by the taxpay-
ers, the Commissioner and the courts.
The majority view is correct in including the amount of taxable
damage awards and settlements allocated to the attorney's contin-
gent fees in the client's gross income.20 4 As previously explained,
Section 61 of the IRC defines gross income as "all income from
whatever source derived."20 5 Unless there is a specific exemption in
the IRC, all income earned or otherwise received by a taxpayer
must be included in the gross income. If a taxpayer incurs ex-
penses in generating income, he or she may be able to deduct the
expenses from gross income to arrive at his or her taxable in-
come.206 A simple example 20 7 illustrates the point: A taxpayer who
201. Foster, 249 F.3d at 1279.
202. Id. at 1279.
203. Although the United States Supreme Court could adopt the minority view and
eliminate the unfairness for plaintiffs who choose contingent fee agreements, this is not
advisable. Adopting the minority view would create even greater inequities because
plaintiffs that hire hourly fee attorneys would still face the same unfairness. Only Con-
gress is in the position to resolve the issue by treating similarly situated plaintiffs
equally.
204. See supra note 75.
205. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of gross
income.
206. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of vari-
ous deductions from gross income.
207. This example is largely based on Judge Posner's example in Kenseth. See Ken-
seth, 259 F.3d at 883.
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receives $90 contingent fee award in a contract dispute and pays
the attorney $30 for legal work performed, has gross income of $90
and a potential deduction of $30. The taxpayer's gross income
should not be limited to the $60 he retains. He had control over
the entire accession to wealth of $90 because he could direct its
distribution when realized.
The minority view, stretching the income concepts beyond
their limits to reach equitable results, would hold that a taxpayer in
the above example has only $60 of gross income. 20 8 The anomaly
of such a holding is clearly evident by the minority's acknowledg-
ment that, but for the contingent fee arrangement, the client would
have had gross income of $90 and a $30 expense.209 Unfortunately,
this line of authority leads to equitable results only when the fee
arrangement is a contingent fee. Clearly, clients who choose to pay
their attorneys on an hourly basis and others who choose contin-
gent fee agreements should not be treated differently under the
IRC. Nonetheless, the minority's frustration with the AMT applica-
tion, and its attempt to eliminate unfairness is understandable. In
cases, such as Alexander, where plaintiffs must include the entire
award in their gross income and yet the real economic costs in-
curred to produce the income are ignored, such as when calculat-
ing the AMT liability, their victorious judgment may turn into an
after tax loss. Although an unintended outcome, it is a disturbing
reality. In response to this fundamental unfairness, some courts
have struggled to develop arguments, at times uncomfortable ones,
to support the exclusion of the portion of the award that goes to
the contingent fee attorney from the client's gross income.
The following are some of the arguments presented by the ma-
jority and the minority courts. Although the author believes that
the majority's view represents the correct result within the present
IRC, the author carefully evaluates and scrutinizes the majority's
and minority's arguments, hoping to persuade future courts, in
208. See text accompanying notes 142-202 for a full discussion of circuit court cases
excluding the amount of attorney's fees in contingent fee lawsuits from client's gross
income.
209. See, e.g., Kenseth's admission in Kenseth stating that if he had hired an hourly
fee attorney, the fee would have been an expense, that is, a deduction and not a reduc-
tion from gross income.
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cases like Alexander, to exclude 210 part of attorney's contingent fees
from client's gross income until a better legislative solution is en-
acted. Even though, "it is not a feasible judicial undertaking to
achieve global equity in taxation,"2 11 the minority courts, by exclud-
ing the amount of attorney's contingent fees from client's gross in-
come, have at least attempted to signal that a change in the IRC is
needed.
1. Proprietary Interest Argument
One of the more persuasive arguments that have been made in
favor of excluding attorney's contingent fees from the client's gross
income is the view that attorneys receive a proprietary interest in
the clients' cause of action when they enter into a contingent fee
arrangement.2 12 The Cotnam decision, in developing its proprietary
interest approach, relied on the Alabama attorney lien statute.
2 13
The court stated that "Mrs. Cotnam's claim at the beginning of the
suit had no fair market value, and that it was doubtful if indeed it
had any value."2 14 The court concluded that Mrs. Cotnam's attor-
ney created the value of her claim by his work in presenting evi-
dence and articulating arguments.
The analogy could be made to a partnership or ajoint venture
arrangement. If Mrs. Cotnam decided to enter into a 60-40 part-
nership with someone to exploit her patent for a technology, she
surely would not be taxed on 100% of the profits if her partner
created great value in the patent by his hard work and talent. Sub-
chapter K of the partnership taxation would require that the in-
come produced with the partnership is allocated to Mrs. Cotnam
and her partner in accordance with their partnership agreement.
If she only held a 60% interest in the partnership, only 60% of the
income would be allocated to her. This outcome finds further sup-
port in the Supreme Court's statement in Horst that "the dominant
purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who
earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit
210. See this Note's Proposed Legislative Solution for a full discussion of which part
of the attorney's contingent fees should be excluded form client's gross income.
211. See Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 944.
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when paid."2 15 Why should Mrs. Cotnam be taxed on 100% of her
damages if she assigned to her attorney 40% of her claim so that
she could collect her 60%? One possible answer is that Mrs. Cot-
nam and her attorney are not partners in the prosecution of her
claim. The claim belongs to Mrs. Cotnam and her attorney is
merely her agent who helps her establish the value of her claim.
However, if Mrs. Cotnam decided from the outset to part with some
control of her claim it is difficult to argue that her attorney was
merely her agent. By controlling Mrs. Cotnam's claim, her attorney
loses the attributes of an agent and becomes more of a joint owner
or a tenant in common with her.
2. Owner-Salesman vs. Client-Attorney Argument
Judge Posner in Kenseth correctly stated that when a firm pays a
salesman a commission for making a sale, the sales income he gen-
erates must be included in the firm's gross income and the sales-
man's commission becomes a deductible business expense for the
employer.2 16 Similarly, a plaintiff who recovers taxable damages in
a contingent fee lawsuit must include the entire amount of the
award in his gross income, and may deduct the legal fees retained
by the attorney as a business expense where appropriate. 217
While the analogy is strong, the cases can be distinguished. At-
torneys and salesmen cannot be treated the same in the above sce-
nario. First, unlike a salesman who presents a finished product to
buyers, an attorney actually develops a product by making argu-
ments and presenting evidence. Second, in prosecuting contingent
lawsuits, attorneys take greater risks than salespersons do in selling
products. At the outset of contingent lawsuits, attorneys do not
know to a certainty what the value of their client's claim is. They
must weigh several factors before even deciding whether to pursue
the claim. They must consider the likelihood that the contingency
will occur, the potential size of the recovery, the amount of work
required, the amount of the lawyer's percentage and when, if at all,
the contingency is likely to occur.218 Attorneys in contingent fee
215. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added).
216. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883.
217. Id.
218. See STEPHEN GiLLERS, REGULATION OF LAwYERs: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
149 (5th ed. 1998).
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agreements take great risks hoping they will get paid. Thus, they
want an interest in the cause of action. The legislatures and courts
have granted such an interest by creating attorney lien statutes.219
Third, and perhaps more important, public policy requires
that attorneys be treated differently than salespersons. By serving
individual clients, attorneys do not merely vindicate private inter-
ests, they are also engaged in the administration ofjustice and serve
the public interests. On the contrary, salespersons, although pro-
moting social good in their employment, are not directly involved
in the administration of justice. Public policy encourages indigent
clients to seek redress in the courts of law, and consistent with that
goal is the exclusion of attorney's contingent fees from client's
gross income. Including the amount of attorney's contingent fees
in client's gross income puts a substantial obstacle in the way of
indigent clients seeking redress in the courts of law. Plaintiffs
might decide not to pursue causes of action in light of the heavy tax
burdens they face.
3. Attorney-Client Partnership vs. Professional Responsibility
Statutes
Some courts have relied on professional responsibility statutes
to find that attorneys and clients are not engaged in ajoint venture
or a partnership when they sign contingent fee agreements, be-
cause such statutes prohibit lawyers from acquiring a proprietary
interest in the client's cause of action and also prohibit them from
sharing fees with non-lawyers. 220 Albeit the general rule is that a
lawyer may not share fees with non-lawyers, and the lawyer is pro-
hibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in the client's cause of
action, most statutes provide an exception for contingent fee agree-
ments. Specifically, Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provides an exception to acquiring a proprietary interest
in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation in the form
of contingent fees. 221 Accordingly, an attorney may acquire a pro-
219. See e.g., Alabama lien statute in Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
220. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883.
221. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8 (j) which states: "A law-
yer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
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prietary interest in the client's cause of action and may enforce
such an interest by getting a lien on the amount of the judgment.
Therefore, an attorney can own a part of the cause of action and
not violate the professional standards.
4. General Contractor & Subcontractor vs. Attorney-Client
In Kenseth, Judge Posner developed another analogy by looking
at general contractors and subcontractors. Posner argued that as a
general contractor must include the entire amount of construction
costs paid by the owner in his gross income, and is allowed a deduc-
tion for the amounts he pays to the subcontractors, so should a cli-
ent include the entire amount of taxable damages received in his
gross income and be allowed a deduction for the attorney's contin-
gent fees paid.222 According to Judge Posner, there should be no
difference in tax treatment of attorney's contingent fees and sub-
contractor bills.
Judge Posner's analysis, similar to the salesperson analysis
above, ignores the risk involved in contingent fee agreements. Sub-
contractors do not sign contingent fee agreements with general
contractors. The only risk subcontractors take is the usual business
risk all entrepreneurs take: the risk of miscalculating their costs or
the risk of not getting paid because the general contractor may be-
come insolvent and other similar risks. These are minimal risks
compared to the risk that attorneys take with a contingent fee ar-
rangement. Moreover, once a subcontractor has completed the
work, he has an enforceable claim to be paid. Mechanics lien laws
might allow subcontractors to make a claim against the property
owner if the general contractor does not pay. On the other hand,
attorneys have no guaranty of getting paid for their services at all.
Like other entrepreneurs, attorneys calculate the risk of entering
into a contingent fee agreement; however, they also do something
more. Like partners in a partnership, attorneys invest their services
for a return of some fixed percentage of potential profits in the
future. Unlike hourly fee attorneys, they assume the risk of not get-
ting paid just as partners assume the risk of losing the benefit of
their efforts if the partnership fails to have a net profit.
2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
222. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884.
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5. Control Argument
By acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's cause of action,
contingent fee attorneys also acquire control over that part of their
client's claim. When Mrs. Cotnam allocated 40% of her claim to
her attorney, she also relinquished control to her attorney of 40%
of her income-producing property, that is, her breach of contract
claim. As the Court in the Glenshaw Glass held, control is one of the
key components of gross income.2 23 Mrs. Cotnam could not collect
her 60% portion of the settlement until her attorney collected his
40% fee first.
Some argue that promises to pay the attorney a percentage of
the recovery is different from giving up control of the claim be-
cause you could use other sources to pay the amount owed. How-
ever, that argument ignores the fact if the contingent fee
agreement prohibits a client from settling his claim without the at-
torney's consent, the client has in effect given up control of his
claim.22 4 If a contingent fee attorney can veto a settlement the cli-
ent desires to enter into, then the attorney has control over the
client's claim.
In Kenseth, Judge Posner also stated that Kenseth never relin-
quished control of the claim because he could fire his contingent
fee lawyer at any time, as he could fire his hourly fee lawyer. 225 This
argument misinterprets the meaning of control. Surely he could
fire both attorneys, but so could partners in a partnership vote to
expel any particular partner or dissolve the partnership. That, how-
ever, does not mean that the particular partner never had control
or a proprietary interest in the partnership. Even though Kenseth
could fire his contingent fee attorney at any time and for any rea-
son, his attorney does not lose control over a potential judgment in
223. See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
224. Even in agreements where attorneys cannot settle claims without their clients'
consent, attorneys may still obtain control over a part of the client's claim. A partner in
a partnership also cannot sell a partnership interest without obtaining either majority
or unanimous consent from the rest of the partners. However, that doesn't mean that
that particular partner never had control over the income-producing property or that
he or she is "assigning" income to people who didn't earn it.
225. See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884.
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the case. If Kenseth recovers, his attorney will collect the reasona-
ble fee he earned in representing Kenseth.
226
6. Landlord-Tenant vs. Attorney-Client Argument
The final analogy that Judge Posner draws in Kenseth between
clients in contingent fee lawsuits and owners of rental property can
also be distinguished. He argues that owners of rental property fre-
quently relinquish physical control of the income-producing prop-
erty to their tenants, but they still must include the entire proceeds
from renting their property in their gross income. 22 7 However, the
Kenseth opinion fails to recognize that there is a difference between
relinquishing total control of the income-producing property and
letting the tenants use the property. Landlords must include the
entire rental proceeds in their gross income not because they give
up control of their property, but because they keep most of the
rights to alienate the property or use it as a security interest, and
only allow the tenants to use their property. At most, they tempora-
rily relinquish control over the physical use of the income-produc-
ing property, but they still posses the inalienable right to dispose of
the property.
To the contrary, clients in contingent fee lawsuits-in cases
where they lose the right to settle without attorney's consent- give
up a percentage of their income-producing property, as well as con-
trol over that property, in expectation of an award the moment they
sign a contingent fee agreement. Clients, unlike landlords, do not
only relinquish control over the use of their income-producing
property, they actually give up a part of their property, which equals
to the attorney's contingent fee percentage. Therefore, the land-
lord-tenant analogy cannot be used to support the inclusion of at-
torney's contingent fees in client's gross income.
7. Discharge of Liability by a Third Party
Some courts have held that discharge of a client's-plaintiff's ob-
ligation to pay legal fees by a third party (the defendant) is
equivalent to the receipt of the proceeds by the plaintiff, and there-
226. Of course, if Kenseth fired his attorney for cause, then the attorney might
forfeit the entire fee depending on the contract and the law of the jurisdiction.
227. Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884.
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fore includible in the plaintiff's gross income. 228 Ordering a third
party to extinguish a person's debt should not absolve that person
from paying the income tax on the amount of the obligation extin-
guished because it amounts to an indirect payment to that per-
son.229 But, a contingent fee lawsuit is different. At the outset of a
lawsuit, the client has no liability to the attorney and will owe noth-
ing unless the client receives an award.230 The client has no per-
sonal obligation until he recovers damages. 231 As the court in
Raymond v. Commissioner stated "[b]ecause the client has not in-
curred a personal obligation, it scarcely seems logical to conclude,
as have the panels in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits that
payments under contingent arrangements serve to discharge cli-
ents' personal obligations to their attorneys, and therefore under
the rule of Old Colony Trust, should be taxed to the clients."
23 2
The inclusion of contingent attorney fees in client's gross in-
come should not depend on whether or not the client recovers
damages. The client has done nothing to gain "control" over the
attorney's portion of the award. If the liability to the attorney ex-
isted before the judge or jury reached its decision, then the client
would have to include the discharge of his or her debt in gross in-
come. But here, because of the specific nature of the contingent
fee agreements, where client's liability to the attorney does not arise
until the client recovers damages, it cannot be said that the client
ordered the third party to discharge the debt. Whether or not the
client is liable for legal fees depends merely on the judge's or the
jury's decision to award monetary damages to the client, and conse-
228. See Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 756.
229. Of course, if the IRC provided an exclusion, for example Section 102, then
the discharge of the liability by a third party will not be considered gross income to the
person whose liability has been extinguished.
230. In some contingent fee agreements the client may be responsible for litigation
expenses even if the client does not recover.
231. See Raymond v. Commissioner, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25426, at 17 (D.Vt. Dec.
17, 2002).
232. Id. at 18 citing Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. 716, 729 (discharge by third
person of taxpayer's obligation is equivalent to receipt by taxpayer); Campbell, 274 F.3d
at 1313-14 (recovery permitted taxpayer to discharge personal obligation owed to attor-
neys); Coady, 213 F.3d at 1191 (taxpayer could not avoid tax by diverting portion of
recovery to her creditor contingent fee counsel); Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454 (funds served
to discharge obligation of partnership to its attorney).
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quently, the client has no control within the meaning of the Glen-
shaw Glass principle of control.
8. Fairness, Deterrence and Non-Compliance Arguments
Decisions such as Coady, Kenseth, Alexander, Baylin, Young and
Davis will deter clients from hiring attorneys on contingent fee basis
and may encourage clients not to comply with the IRC. The en-
forcement of our tax laws and extraction of tax revenue will be-
come more difficult. The integrity of our entire tax system is
undermined when the tax system appears unreasonable and unfair.
By including attorney's portion of the award in the client's gross
income, the client is taxed on the monetary amount that never be-
comes economic income. It cannot be said that the client enjoyed
the portion he never received, because that portion belonged to
the attorney from the outset of the lawsuit. As a result, the appear-
ance of unfair taxation may encourage noncompliance with the
IRC.
In addition, the United States, unlike other countries, has
made a public policy decision to allow contingent fee agreements.
These types of agreements allow clients to seek redress in the courts
of law even if they cannot afford paying hourly fees. Including the
entire amount allocated to the attorney's contingent fees in the cli-
ents' gross income will force clients to abandon justifiable causes of
action in light of the heavy tax burden they face. Moreover, when
the cause is proper, Congress has usually lowered tax burdens as an
incentive to engage in certain activities-for example, investment
tax credits and education credits. Congress should also consider
excluding attorney's contingent fees from plaintiffs gross income
(as described in this Note's Proposed Legislative Solution below) in
order to encourage vindication of public and private grievances by
avoiding the inequitable results reached by the AMT application.
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
In light of the clear disagreement among the circuit courts,
Congress should step in to resolve the problem. One solution may
be to completely eliminate restrictions on deductibility of legal fees
paid in determining taxpayer's AMT liability. The nondeductibility
of legal fees for AMT purposes creates "phantom" income because
2003]
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taxpayer's real economic position is effectively overstated. Taxpay-
ers-both those that hire hourly fee attorneys as well as those that
sign contingent fee agreements-are "effectively robbed of any
benefit of the [1] egal [f] ees"233 paid, in determining their AMT lia-
bility. The real economic benefit to a taxpayer who received a
$90,000 award and paid $30,000 in legal fees is only $60,000 and
not $90,000. By disallowing deductions for the legal fees paid, the
AMT undermines fairness-the very goal it was intended to
achieve. The income tax is turned into a gross receipts tax for the
plaintiff.
Another possible solution is to include in the client's gross in-
come the amount of attorney's contingent fees that represents the
attorney's total billable hours spent on the case, determined based
on the attorney's hourly rate or fair market value of the time spent.
Or, stated differently, this approach would exclude from plaintiffs
gross income the amount of the award retained by the contingent
fee attorney to the extent it exceeds the fair market value of the
attorney's services based on his or her usual hourly rates. This pro-
posal would balance the concerns the circuits have expressed. In
addition, it would preserve horizontal equity. Horizontal equity re-
quires that taxpayers in similar positions be treated equally if the
tax system is to be perceived as fair and balanced. Therefore, tax-
payers who decide to pay their attorneys an hourly fee and taxpay-
ers who signed contingent fee agreements should be treated
equally, because they are both plaintiffs who merely chose different
schemes for compensating their attorneys.
Taxpayers who decide to pay their attorneys an hourly fee must
include in their gross income the entire amount of damages recov-
ered, and may be able to deduct the legal fees paid as miscellane-
ous itemized deductions. Therefore, to be fair, and preserve
horizontal equity, taxpayers who choose contingent fee agreements
should also include in their gross income at least the amount of
legal fees that they would have paid had they signed an hourly fee
agreement. They could also, if applicable, deduct that portion of
the fees as miscellaneous itemized deductions. However, the differ-
ence between the total contingent fee and the fee that would have
been charged had the client signed an hourly fee agreement should
233. See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946.
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not be included in the client's gross income because the difference
represents the attorney's proprietary interest in the cause of action.
This solution will force hourly fee clients and contingent fee clients
to include in their gross income an equal amount of legal fees paid.
More importantly, in situations where two clients, one that signed
an hourly fee agreement and the other that signed a contingent fee
agreement, receive the same award and pay the same amount of
legal fees-assuming everything else is equal-they will pay the
same amount of tax on the net proceeds they retain.
Attorneys would not be affected by this change since they
would still have to include the entire fee received in their gross in-
come. This proposed solution would benefit clients, especially in
cases where the contingent fee collected by the attorneys would be
much larger than had the client signed an hourly fee agreement.
This certainly makes sense in light of the policy reasons that sup-
port contingent fee agreements.
Consider for example, the case of In re Metro Mobile CTS, Inc.
Shareholders Litig.,234 where shareholders-plaintiffs were awarded
around $50 million in a shareholder class action suit.235 The Vice
Chancellor awarded the lawyer 16.7% of the settlement, or $8.5 mil-
lion. 23 6 The attorney spent approximately 2,125 hours settling the
case, which when compared with the contingent fee, amounted to
around $4,000 per hour.23 7 Can we candidly claim that the entire
fee should be included in the clients' gross income? Is it possible to
treat hourly fee agreements and contingent fee agreements entirely
the same? Most of the plaintiffs-taxpayers would never be able to
afford such a gigantic hourly fee. What is the economic reality of
this transaction? Would the Commissioner likely find the $4,000
hourly rate as a reasonable "ordinary and necessary" expense within
the meaning of Section 212? If this had been a "plain" hourly fee
contract, where the terms of the contract called for a $4,000 hourly
fee, it is quite possible that the Commissioner would have disal-
lowed the deduction as "unreasonable." It is also possible that the
attorney charging such an enormous hourly fee would be sanc-
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tioned under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which pro-
hibit charging of "unreasonably high fees."238 As we consider these
questions and their possible answers, it becomes evident that, after
all, it is not feasible to treat hourly fee clients and contingent fee
clients entirely the same. This Proposed Legislative Solution cap-
tures the economic reality of the transaction and accounts for the
fact that the contingent fee attorney is both: (1) the plaintiffs part-
ner in the prosecution of the claim; and (2) the plaintiffs agent who
helps him establish the value of his claim. As the plaintiffs agent he
is compensated for the total time spent on the case based on his
hourly rate, and as the plaintiff's partner the attorney shares in the
award beyond the hourly fee earned.
Attorneys in contingent fee cases are compensated at a much
higher rate because of the risks they take. Their role is more simi-
lar to an investor, or a partner, and not merely an agent or an em-
ployee of the client. As such, they acquire a partial interest in their
clients' cause of action. On the other hand, hourly fee attorneys do
not acquire an interest in the cause of action because the risk of
losing the investment is entirely on the client. Hourly fee attorneys
expect to be paid regardless of the outcome. Consequently, in con-
tingent fee lawsuits the amount of legal fees that are above the
amount that an hourly attorney would have charged under the cir-
cumstances belongs to the attorney as his proprietary interest. Af-
ter all, that is his reward for taking the case.
V. CONCLUSION
As we have seen throughout this Note, the current state of the
law leads to unfair results. However, although unfair, the majority
of the courts are correct in their application of the present IRC. Sec-
tion 61 of the IRC, Glenshaw Glass and Lucas' doctrine of assign-
ment of income all lead to the same conclusion: attorney's
contingent fees must be included in the winning plaintiffs gross
income. The minority's view, excluding contingent legal fees from
plaintiff's gross income stretches the IRC to great limits in its quest
to reach the equitable result. But, it has long been established that
238. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a).
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"equitable arguments cannot overcome the plain meaning of the
statute. "239
A legislative solution is needed to correct the problem. Until
then, taxpayers should continue to argue for exclusion of attorney's
contingent fees from their gross income. Arguments in support of
the minority view, as outlined in section IV of this Note, are at times
uncomfortable to make, but are forced upon the taxpayers by the
unforeseen and inequitable results of the AMT application. The
situation cries out for a prompt resolution, and Congress should
certainly make a policy decision to either allow a full deduction for
the legal fees paid, or exclude from client's gross income the por-
tion of contingent attorney fees that are above what an hourly rate
attorney would have charged under the same or similar
circumstances.
Our tax system should not discourage people from seeking re-
dress in the courts of law by imposing heavy tax burdens on clients
who cannot afford to pay their attorneys an hourly fee. Situations
like Alexander can produce astonishing results. A victorious plain-
tiff, after paying all expenses and taxes, may end up with an after-
tax loss. Moreover, penalizing clients as in Alexander, is not the way
our tax system was envisioned to operate. While it is true that Sec-
tion 61 of the IRC states gross income means "all income from
whatever source derived," 240 Justice Harlan also teaches us that "[i]t
is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes
the law. The letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of
the law is the soul. '24 1 The AMT should not be allowed to create
phantom income when economic income does not exist. Congress
needs to act quickly to restore faith and fairness in the IRC.
239. See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946.
240. I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
241. US v. Stanley, 109 U.S 3 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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